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The Taskbar signals another email arriving, probably the latest “impact of CoViD-19” thoughts of one 
of the research departments in real estate or financial service firms around the world. At least they 
have partly stemmed the tide of prop-tech and Brexit impact emails. They predict the end of the 
conventional office or the resurgence of demand for offices; the decline of large cities or a further 
concentration of business; V-shaped, U-shaped, W-shaped and L-shaped economic recovery; flat or 
rising interest rates, flat or rising inflation rates; student housing is resilient to the new market 
environment or highly vulnerable to travel restrictions; residential markets will recover quickly or 
remain in stasis, with rises (or falls) focused in suburban areas (or city centres or small towns) …  Some 
have a cautious, nuanced tone, others are more confident, seem more sure of their prognosis. Given 
the disparity in the predictions, what information, in aggregate, do they convey?  
 
Major events such as the pandemic or the global financial crisis (and the long asset market 
boom/bubble that preceded it) are characterised by high degrees of uncertainty. We cannot be sure 
if the models and relationships that held before the event will hold afterwards, whether or not they 
represent a structural break. To an extent, the outcomes, observed from within the event, are 
definitionally “unknowable” and, while path dependent, the actual course may be determined by 
random events. Realistically, all we can do is to set out scenarios, perhaps assign rough probabilities 
to their occurrence. How, then, can all these documents be so certain? What insights do their authors 
have? Some may come from advanced market information, from early knowledge of the decisions of 
clients (who, themselves, face the same uncertainty): but more it will come from the need to be seen 
to make confident predictions.  
 
From a business perspective, this is probably a rational strategy. To give clients and customers that 
sense of confidence, that you understand the situation and can provide expert advice is critical. More 
significantly, does it matter if you are right or wrong? If you are wrong, few will recall this (who other 
than Neil Crosby and I can remember the 1988 Richard Ellis competition to guess the timing of the 
first £100/foot City of London office rent?); if you are right, you become a maestro or seer – and will 
take every opportunity to remind the world of your presience and the fallibility of your competitors.  
That was undoubtedly the case post-GFC where a number of those guessing right have created careers 
as authors and pundits (ironically, one of the best known perhaps renowned from a book – more 
accurately, an oft-repeated title of a book – which had as its main argument that forecasting finanical 
markets was largely impossible). In practice many researchers foresaw the market turn and asset price 
reversal: I wasn’t alone in the mid-2000s in arguing that commercial real estate prices were too high 
and leverage was too great (and I have the slides to prove it) but at issue was that no-one wanted to 
listen at that time. I was asked “what could possibly cause the market to turn?” and responded “a 
shock”. “What will that shock be?” came the response. But if I knew what the shock was going to be, 
then it wouldn’t be a shock, would it?   
 
In early real estate classes, I like to put up a graph of commercial real estate investment performance 
and, set against it, the performance of individual investors (see Figure 1). One investment fund stands 
above the others, consistently outperforming. The students are asked to say why this fund has done 
so well. Most of the responses relate to manager skillsets – superior stock selection, superior asset 
allocation, market timing, specialist knowledge of sub-markets, good capital structure decisions. 
Others relate to fund characteristics such as size bringing economies of scale or reduced cost of capital. 
The fund manager is given agency: she determines the outcome; she too will attain hero status. It is 
very rare that the students will offer an alternative explanation: that it is just luck. But, in this case, 
that really is all that it is. The lines on the graph, investors A to E, are simply the market performance 
plus or minus a random amount. Recalculate the spreadsheet and the order changes, maybe another 
fund will seem to outperform, maybe they will all cluster around the market line.  The result is 
contingent, not on skill but on chance.  
 
Figure 1: Fund Outperformance and The Role of Chance 
 
 
The property market likes its maestros and seers: in real estate, it is part of it being a “people industry”, 
a phrase that is supposed to contrast our friendly sector with the dry mathematical approaches of 
financial markets and to emphasise that each property is unique, meaning that aggregate analytic 
models must be tempered by market feel. This, though, is true of other parts of the built environment 
professions: much quoted architects who can sequentially and confidentially predict the drive towards 
open plan large floorplate offices, then a return to smaller cellular space, then shared flexible office 
space and then the disappearance of offices entirely; revered planning academics whose fame rests 
on the prediction of the grassing over of abandonned and hollowed out city centres, shortly followed 
by the lauding of the redensification of cities; urban theorists whose ideas of the drivers of city success 
and the role of culture seem to have no firm evidential basis; esteemed developers with a track record 
of driving their firms into financial distress. This is understandable: we want to believe that strong-
willed, skilled individuals can influence events and performance, that they can “generate alpha” (a 
phrase adopted widely adopted by practitioners without taking on board many of the implications of 
asset pricing theories), that they can “beat the market”. And if they can then, surely, so could we?  
 
There are consequences, though, of this emphasis on individual skill and agency. The Investment 
Property Forum’s Hurdle Rate research, published in 2017, revealed the extent to which individual 
managers and investment committees in firms and funds had the right to override modelled outcomes 
on buy-sell decisions. Further, it showed the extent to which many of the models used were 
inconsistent with standard corporate finance principles and remained relatively unsophisticated, even 
in larger institutional investment funds. Having the right to override and decide outcomes empowers 
senior managers – it also provides incentives and exemplars for junior professionals to adopt the 
individualistic approach and abandon more quantitative toolkits acquired in the education process. 
This is not to advocate slavish adoption of model-based approaches: clearly for large projects 
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risk will be absorbed at portfolio level, for funds with a small number of assets, missing critical risk 
factors could have potentially catastrophic effects. The evidence, though, suggested that, more often 
than not, it was negative modelled decisions that were over-turned: “it smells right” dominated “I 
don’t like the look of this one”. This issue is compounded by the absence of a culture of back-testing, 
to find out what factors influence success (and failure) in decision making and to assess the impact of 
an individual or investment committee override of an analytic recommendation.  
 
Although measurement problems abound, the available empirical evidence provides little evidence to 
provide confidence in the superior skills of these hero investors and seers and their ability to deliver 
better risk-adjusted returns. Although the phrase “delivering alpha” has become a standard part of 
the real estate lexicon, there’s at most weak and contradictory evidence of fund managers or firms 
actually achieveing this; successful funds do not consistenty lead to successful follow-up funds; value-
add and opportunity funds do not, on average or in aggregate, generate returns that fully compensate 
investors for additional risk; leverage has negative impacts on performance once risk is accounted for; 
there is scant evidence of market-timing in acquisition and sales decisions or in capital structuring – if 
anything the market gears up at the top of the cycle (being charitable, one could characterise that as 
“risk-sharing” and blame the banks for pro-cyclical lending behaviour). These are all relatively 
consistent empirical findings and yet, if stated to the industry and profession, they are not believed: 
why? Is it simply vested interests or some form of cognotive filtering?  
 
The behavioural turn in economics, now increasingly used in real estate research, has generated new 
insights into decision-making behaviour (but also much over-statement, with conventional economics 
and finance caricatured as assuming all investors are profit-maximising rational agents – which is 
untrue, since there is a well-developed body of research on uninformed traders, uncertainty, noise 
and market processes, much of which precedes any citations of Khaneman and Tversky). Much of that 
work, however, has focussed on individual decision-making and estimation (over-confidence, 
anchoring, information processing biases, loss aversion and so forth) which, thus, does not really touch 
on why the industry searches for and misidentifies heroes. To an extent, the literature on herding 
behaviour does approach the issue, particularly that which related to reputational herding. If there 
are key opinion formers, then there may be a quasi-rationale for following them and then a validation 
process that highlights success and erases failures or non-conforming outcomes.  
 
Herding and trend following may also be more rational in a market like private real estate with strong 
information asymmetry, entry barriers, illiquidity and specific risk factors such that “the market can 
stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent” may hold more strongly than in more liquid financial 
assets where access to mechanisms and vehicles for shorting the market are readily available. 
However, it does seem to me that there is an undeveloped seam of work to be mined to examine the 
culture of decision-making and the role of individuals that goes beyond some of the unnuanced 
stereotypes from the “financialisation” literature or the lionisation in the professional press. That 
examination could also usefully examine how beliefs become entrenched in real estate markets often, 
again, in the face of empirical evidence: truths that are so self-evident that contrary evidence must 
simply be flawed. The belief systems and the role of key opinion-formers are intertwined.  
 
As an example, consider the widely-held argument that major global urban centres and gateway cities 
generate superior performance. To be fair, this is challenged, but tends to reassert its dominant 
position as received widsom. Empirically, in general they do not, there is abundant evidence of that. 
The commercial real estate markets and, in particular, the office markets of such cities tend to be 
more volatile, to have significant downside risks and to be more closely aligned, such that shocks 
propogate from one market to another, undermining diversification benefits. This is often denied by 
practitioners or counter-benefits proposed: greater transparency simply means the volatility is 
revealed, there is greater liquidity (ofen cited by those who do not need that liquidity and should not 
be paying a premium for it), that the markets recover faster from downturns (yes, partly because of 
the investment flows, but equally typically they fell more and that recovery does not drive risk-
adjusted return). A more valid rationale might be scale of investment for the largest players, but the 
strongest advocates of large city plays are often smaller funds and even larger investors may be 
compromising diversification and hence the risk-adjusted returns of their portfolios.  
 
A related example is the entrenched belief that economic growth is captured in real estate rents. This 
is a complex area, but once again the empirical evidence is against it for standing investments. Long-
run data for a wide range of cities in diverse locations shows, typically, that real per square metre 
rental growth is close to zero over long periods of time and over periods of substantial urban growth 
(Figure 2 shows real office rents in the City of London market 1984-2019: over 35 years which included 
the restructuring of the City of London following financial deregulation: the average annual growth in 
rents afer inflation is -0.9%). This might, at first sight, seem counter-intutive - surely if the economy in 
a market becomes more productive and profitable then rents must rise to capture the improved 
locational advantage? However, this ignores the supply-side adjustment (even though this may be 
lagged and generate cyclical behaviour). Land values capture that rise in productivity, through change 
of use, redevelopment and densification (to an extent limited by topographical or planning constraints 
for a period). However, that may be of little benefit for a finite life investor buying standing 
investments in that market, except to the extent that the redevelopment option is embedded in the 
exit value of the investment (but it was also presumably embedded in the entry price): hence any 
outperformance will depend on the state of the cycle (and the issues of market timing noted above). 
Again, this is an empirical finding that is, typically, simply rejected by many practitioners when 
confronted with it. 
  
Figure 2 City of London Real Office Rental Values 
 
Source: adapted from CBRE, ONS. Rental value index deflated by RPI index.  
 
In passing, it is worth noting that the point about supply adjustment applies to many of the currently 
favoured sectors of the property market. For example, it appears to be received wisdom that logistic 
warehouses must generate growth due to the growing role of digital technology through internet 























are the land and land-use planning constraints to prevent supply side adjustment? What might this 
imply for the implicit rental growth in the rapidly falling cap rates in the logisitics sub-sector? Do similar 
concerns apply in relation to data centres and other of the alternative real estate sectors sought out 
by return seeking investors?  
 
To some extent, the reluctance to accept the evidence of low after-inflation rental growth, while 
puzzling, relates to behavioural traits that fail to distinguish between nominal and real growth (such 
as money illusion). This in turn points to another entrenched belief, in real esate’s inflation hedging 
properties. In part this is a semantic issue (inflation hedging is not the same as delivering long-run 
above inflation returns). To an extent, commercial property acts as a real asset in that rents, ceteris 
paribus, will tend to rise with inflation (although that cannot be guaranteed, as much of the retail 
sector shows, and one must allow for structural breaks, technological change and firms substituting 
capital, technology and labour for land and building). However, the relationship between inflation and 
interest rates and, in turn, the relationship between (real) interest rates and (real) cap rates makes 
the inflation / capital value relationship much more nuanced and complex than is often assumed, 
often critically dependent on the source of inflationary pressures.  
 
 It would be easy to provide many other examples of tenets and beliefs that are weakly founded or 
that run counter to empirical evidence – and indeed, there are older examples that have been 
confined to history and forgotten too but were central in their time (applying substantially higher 
discount rates to the bond-like over rented cashflows in the 1990s since they were obviously high risk 
comes to mind). Why, though, are such beliefs so sticky? Why do they persist, in the face of contrary 
evidence? Is it a function of the specific characteristics of private real estste markets or is it something 
about the processes driving education, recruitment, employment and progression of staff?  How do 
these two drivers interrelate? That real estate is a “people industry” might be one of its key USPs, but 
it has real consequences. The cult of the individual and entrenchment of core beliefs in the face of 
evidence might well merit more detailed study.  
